Short-line railroad managers discuss class I railroads by Johnson, James C et al.
Journal of Transportation Management
Volume 13 | Issue 2 Article 5
9-1-2002
Short-line railroad managers discuss class I railroads
James C. Johnson
St. Cloud State University
Diane J. McClure
St. Cloud State University
Kenneth C. Schneider
St. Cloud State University
Donald F. Wood
San Francisco State University
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.wayne.edu/jotm
Part of the Operations and Supply Chain Management Commons, and the Transportation
Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Open Access Journals at DigitalCommons@WayneState. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Journal of Transportation Management by an authorized editor of DigitalCommons@WayneState.
Recommended Citation
Johnson, James C., McClure, Diane J., Schneider, Kenneth C., & Wood, Donald F. (2002). Short-line railroad managers discuss class I
railroads. Journal of Transportation Management, 13(2), 27-44. doi: 10.22237/jotm/1030838640
SHORT-LINE RAILROAD MANAGERS 
DISCUSS CLASS I RAILROADS
James C. Johnson 
St. Cloud State University
Diane J. McClure 
St. Cloud State University
Kenneth C. Schneider 
St. Cloud State University
Donald F. Wood 
San Francisco State University
ABSTRACT
Managers/owners of short-line railroads were queried about three issues: (1) How would you 
describe your company’s business relationship with the Class I railroad(s) with which you 
interchange traffic; (2) Do you believe that mergers between Class I railroads have been good 
or bad for short-line railroads; and (3) Besides merger activity, what do you believe will be the 
most important trend for Class I railroads in the next 10 years?
INTRODUCTION
Short-line railroads (defined herein as railroads 
with less than 250 miles of trackage) have been 
part of the transportation industry for many 
decades. Before 1970 their numbers had been in 
a long term decline. For example, in 1916 there 
were approximately 1,000 of these carriers, but 
by 1970 the number had shrunk to about 240 
companies (Levine et al., 1982). The federal 
regulatory environment became more friendly
toward the formation of new short-line railroads 
starting in the early 1970s. This was precipi­
tated by the bankruptcy of the Milwaukee Road 
and the Rock Island railroads. Because portions 
of these railroads could be operated profitably, 
the federal government enacted laws to facilitate 
the operation of the viable segments of the failed 
carriers. Specific legislation included: (a.) The 3- 
R Act of 1973, (b.) The 4-R Act of 1976, and (c.) 
The Local Rail Service Assistance Act of 1978 
(Babcock et al., 1995).
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Further encouragement of the short-line rail 
sector took place in 1980 by the enactment of the 
Staggers Rail Act. This law facilitated the 
formation of new short-lines by procedures that 
liberalized the abandonment of light traffic 
density trackage by the larger Class I railroads. 
(Class I railroads are defined by the Surface 
Transportation Board in terms of their annual 
revenues, adjusted yearly for inflation. 
Currently, Class I railroads have approximately 
$260 million or more in revenues.) Much of the 
abandoned trackage became the new short-line 
railroads (Due 1984). Between 1980 and 1989, 
approximately 230 new short-lines began 
operation (Babcock et al., 1995).
The purpose of this study is to learn more about 
what managers of short-line railroads think 
about Class I railroads. To accomplish this 
objective, we surveyed about 450 owners/ 
managers of short-line railroads. Specifically, 
this article will address the following topics: (a.) 
A brief literature review, (b.) A description of the 
research methodology utilized, (c.) An exami­
nation of the respondents’ answers to this 
question, “Overall, how would you describe your 
company’s business relationship with the Class 
I railroads with which you interchange traffic?” 
(d.) A look at how the short-line owner/managers 
answered this query, “Do you think the recent 
history of mergers between Class I railroads has 
been good or bad for short-line rail companies?” 
and (e.) An analysis of how the respondents 
replied to this question, “Besides merger activity, 
what do you believe will be the most important 
trend for Class I railroads in the next ten years?”
BRIEF LITERATURE REVIEW
Short-line railroads are typically established 
when a Class I railroad spins-off their low traffic 
density trackage. For example, when the 
Burlington Northern and the Santa Fe railroads 
merged in 1995, the combined carrier sold about 
2,000 miles of trackage to short-line railroads 
(Fairbank 1999). In 2000 the BNSF indicated 
that additional lighter density trackage will be 
spun-off to short-lines (Blanchard 2001c). Other 
rail industry observers believe that additional
Class I carriers will also continue to rationalize 
their route system (Kruglinski 2001). Class I 
railroads prefer to sell this trackage, because 
short-lines generate additional business that 
would have been lost if the trackage was 
abandoned (Due 1984; Landry and Ozment 
2001a). Finally, short-line railroads are also 
involved in mergers. RailAmerica operates 
approximately 40 short-lines in North American 
and continues to add properties to its corporate 
structure. In late 2001 it purchased StatesRail, 
a privately owned company that operates eight 
short-line railroads (Gallagher 2001a; Rock 
2002).
Operating Characteristics
There are approximately 450 short-line railroads 
in the United States today (Pocket 2000). They 
operate in an analogous manner to commuter 
airlines that feed passengers between smaller 
cities and major city airports. Short-line rail­
roads collect freight from shippers on light 
density trackage and transport it to the Class I 
main-line intercity trackage for delivery to the 
consignee, and vice versa. Rail industry 
management consultant, Roy Blanchard, noted,
The short-line thus is the bridge between 
the batch process of the Class I and the 
custom-made process of the small 
railroad (Blanchard 2001b).
Most, but not all (Turner 2001), short-line 
employees are non-union. While this typically 
results in lower wage rates, a more important 
advantage to management is the less restrictive 
work-rules compared to a unionized labor force. 
Thus, the locomotive engineer may operate the 
train in the morning, do track maintenance work 
in the early afternoon, and make sales calls in 
the late afternoon (Babcock 1995; Due 1984; Due 
and Leever 1997; Probing 1995).
Problems
A recent survey of short-line railroad managers 
by Professors Landry and Ozment found that the 
most serious threat, as perceived by these
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managers, involved their relationships with 
Class I railroads (Landry and Ozment 2001b). 
Here is a summary of the main problems 
involving Class I railroads: (a.) Short-lines 
receive an inadequate percentage of the total 
revenues when interlining with Class I carriers 
(Due and Leever 1997), (b.) After initially 
purchasing the trackage from the selling Class I 
carrier, it is so run-down from years of deferred 
maintenance, that the short-line cannot afford to 
bring it back to acceptable operating standards 
(Carroll 2001), (c.) A “paper barrier” is often 
imposed by the selling Class l carrier that 
mandates that the short-line must interline 
exclusively with them, even if other short-lines 
or Class I’s have trackage that connects to the 
short-line railroad (Wilner 2000c; Wilner 2001a; 
Wilner 2000a), (d.) The Class I’s will not 
adequately supply the short-line with rail cars 
during times of seasonal shortages (Due and 
Leever 1997; Gallagher 1999; Landry and 
Ozment 2001b; Kaufman 2000a), (e.) Class I 
railroads try to convince shippers to locate new 
facilities directly on the Class Fs trackage, so the 
Class I does not have to share the rail revenue 
with the short-line (Burke 1997), (f.) Class I 
carriers desire to exclusively transport rail cars 
that accommodate 286,000 gross weight tons, 
and many short-lines do not have trackage or 
bridges that can safely handle this weight 
(Burke 1997; Gallagher 2000; Saylor 1999; 
Wilner 1999; Zarembski and Turner 2001), and 
(g.) Class I service standards are often so bad 
that shippers become frustrated and switch their 
business to the trucking industry (Duff 2000a; 
Gallagher 2000; Judge 2000; Kaufman 2000b; 
Vantuono 2001a).
Three additional problems that do not involve 
Class I railroads are: (a.) Short-lines are 
devastated when floods or storms wash-out 
bridges, tunnels and trackage, because they 
typically do not have the ability to re-route their 
trains around the problem (Due 1984), (b.)
There may not be enough business located on 
their trackage to generate adequate revenues to 
stay in business, especially if many of the 
shippers are in the same business which then 
experiences an economic downturn in their
industry (Due and Leever 1997; Glischinski 
2000; Prater and Babcock 1998; Wilner 2001b), 
and (c.) Federal Railroad Administration safety 
regulations often place unreasonable burdens on 
small railroads (Landry and Ozment 2001a; 
Landry and Ozment 2001b).
Service Successes
The recent survey of short-line managers by 
Professors Landry and Ozment also asked 
respondents what was their greatest competitive 
advantage over the Class I railroads. By far the 
most common answer was their ability to provide 
shippers with customized service (Landry and 
Ozment 2001b). Service excellence increases 
sales. Burlington Northern Santa Fe CEO Matt 
Rose noted that in recent years, short-line 
railroad revenues have been growing at an 
annual rate of 7%, while Class Fs sales are 
advancing only 2.5% annually (Blanchard 2001c; 
Gallagher 2001c). BNSF Vice-President Peter 
Rickershauser commented that,
Short-lines bring us business that we 
couldn’t otherwise get, with a creativity 
that, quite frankly, is hard to match 
(Vantuono 2001a).
The BNSF obviously appreciates the service 
excellence of short-lines. Dave Garin, a BNSF 
manager, speaking at a rail industry conference 
about short-line railroad strengths, observed, 
“It’s all about service, service, service, and you 
can do it best,” (Blanchard 2001a).
An example of this customer friendly service is 
provided by the Indiana Rail Road. Its employees 
stress improved service reliability. They daily 
transport GE refrigerators with a dedicated 25 
car train that runs from the GE factory at 
Bloomington, Indiana, to CSXT, a Class I 
railroad, at Indianapolis. Tom Hoback, CEO and 
President of Indiana Rail Road, said
I’ve always believed that if you could run 
a railroad like a business and not like a 
railroad, you could do well. We took a 
railroad that was going to be abandoned
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in the 1970s and increased traffic more 
than five-fold (Blanchard 2001c).
Class I Mergers
The railroad industry’s “Golden Era” came to an 
end in 1916. Prior to this, railroads had a near 
monopoly on domestic intercity transportation. 
The only serious competitor was barge trans­
portation on a few waterways and coastal, or 
intercoastal, shipping. Total railroad track 
mileage in 1916 was 254,000 miles, and it 
declined every year thereafter. The primary 
reason was the growth of the trucking industry 
(Stover 1961). Concomitant with the declining 
trackage came a decrease in the number of 
intercity railroads. In 1898 there were 836 Class 
I railroads (Thirteenth 1900), and by 1936 this 
number had decreased to 139 (Locklin 1938). 
What follows are the number of Class I railroads 
for selected years: 1970—71; 1980—42; 
1990—16; 1994—13; and early 2002—7 (Annual; 
Association 2002). Prior to the 1980s, many rail 
mergers were “side-by-side,” meaning that the 
two railroads in many cases served the same 
geographic area. After the merger, the duplicate 
trackage was often sold to short-line railroads. 
More recently the predominant form of rail 
merger has been the “end-to-end” type, 
indicating that each railroad prior to the merger 
served a different geographic area. These types 
of mergers involved less reduction of trackage 
(Burns 1998; Johnson and Whiteside 1975; 
Saunders 2001; Wilner 1997).
With only four major rail systems in the 
U.S.—Burlington Northern Santa Fe, CSX, 
Norfolk Southern, and Union Pacific—some 
shippers believe that rail management has 
become arrogant. Edward M. Emmett, president 
of the National Industrial Transportation 
League, (a large shippers’ organization) noted,
Major rail customers continue to be 
frustrated not only by inconsistent 
service, but also. by a[n] “imperial” 
attitude on the part of some railroads 
(Gottlieb 2001).
This situation, along with the service 
breakdowns that have occurred with recent rail 
mergers (some shippers refer to this as “track 
trauma” (North 2000; O’Reilly 1998)), led the 
Surface Transportation Board to declare a fifteen 
month moratorium on all Class I rail mergers 
that ended in June 2001. This action was taken 
after the Burlington Northern Santa Fe and 
Canadian National applied to the STB for 
permission to merge. These carriers have since 
withdrawn their merger application (Why 2000; 
Shoot-out 2000; Wilner 2000b).
The newly revised STB rail merger guidelines 
became effective in June 2001 (Rail 2001). They 
were designed to not just preserve rail 
competition, but to enhance it. Future rail 
merger applications must contain a “Service 
Assurance Plan,” which details exactly how and 
why the combined carrier will be able to render 
improved service to their shippers. In addition, 
applications that contain “competitive enhance­
ments” will be more favorably considered. These 
include trackage rights, reciprocal switching 
agreements, and improved efforts to work with 
short-line railroads (New 2001).
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
To address the aforementioned objectives, a 
survey of owners and managers of short-line rail 
companies was designed. The mailing list was 
compiled from Primedia Directories’ The Pocket 
List of Railroad Officials. For purposes of this 
study, a short-line railroad was operationally 
defined as any railroad identified in the Pocket 
List that operates a system that includes a 
maximum of 250 miles of trackage. This 
definition is consistent with but not identical to 
the Surface Transportation Board (STB) “Class 
III railroad” designation (any railroad with an 
annual operating revenue of less than $20.5 
million) and/or to the Association of American 
Railroads (AAR) “local railroad” designation (any 
railroad with an annual operating revenue below 
$40 million and less than 350 miles of track 
operated).
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The actual mailing list was compiled as follows. 
There are a total of 725 railroad companies 
identified in the Pocket List. Of these, 125 were 
deleted for one or another of the following 
reasons:
• Company was identified as STB Class I or Class 
II railroad
• Company was identified as an AAR regional as 
opposed to local railroad
• Company was headquartered outside the 
United States
• No mailing address was included with the 
directory listing
Of the remaining 600 railroad companies, another 
149 were deleted because of duplicated man­
agement or cross-over ownership so that any 
given individual would be asked to participate no 
more than once. The final mailing list consisted of 
451 unique owners/managers. Each of these per­
sons was mailed a copy of the questionnaire 
approximately one week following receipt of a 
postcard announcing the survey and requesting 
participation. In addition, each was sent a “thank- 
you” letter and follow-up copy of the question­
naire approximately ten days later, for a total of 
three separate mailed contacts. During this 
period, nine questionnaires were returned for bad 
addresses, reflecting a very high overall rate of 
accuracy in the Pocket Directory.
Of the 442 delivered questionnaires, responses 
were eventually received from a total of 114, 
representing a response rate of 26%. This level of 
participation is considered very adequate, espe­
cially given the professional nature and harried 
work lives of the sampled population of railroad 
owners and managers. Of these 114 usable re­
sponses, an additional seventeen were deleted 
because they represented companies that 
exceeded the 250 mile trackage limit set in the 
operational definition of a short-line railroad 
guiding this study. The remaining 97 companies 
comprise the data base of short-line rail com­
panies on which the results reported herein are 
based.
PROFILE OF RESPONDENTS 
AND RESPONDING COMPANIES
As measured by number of employees, the 
responding companies were quite small. The 
sample was divided almost evenly between 
companies with fewer than ten employees 
(49.5%) and those with ten or more employees 
(50.5%). One-fourth of the responding companies 
had fewer than five employees, and three-fourths 
of them had fewer than twenty-five employees. 
Company size was also measure by annual 
revenue, but those results are not presented here 
for two reasons. First, sixteen of the 97 qualified 
respondents (16.5%) chose not to disclose their 
annual revenue. Second, there is a significant 
and fairly strong correlation (+.504, p < .001) 
between revenue and number of employees.
A different dimension of a short-line railroad’s 
size is captured by the total miles of trackage it 
operates, that being an indication of the line’s 
geographical coverage. About two-fifths (39.2%) 
of the short-line companies in the study operate 
with more than 50 miles of track (up to the 
qualifying limit of 250 miles), and three-fifths 
(60.8%) operate with fewer than 50 miles of 
track. Again, forty percent of the companies have 
fewer than 25 miles of track and fifteen percent 
have fewer than ten miles of track.
Just over one-third (36.1%) of the companies 
included in the study were formed before the 
1980 Stagger’s Act that substantially 
deregulated the U.S. rail industry. Another one- 
fourth (26.8%) were formed during the industry’s 
tumultuous decade of the 1980s, and the 
remainder were started between 1990 and 2000.
Respondents were also queried about their own 
age and education. They are very highly 
educated. Nearly forty percent (39.2%) have 
earned a 4-year degree, and another one-fourth 
(24.7%) have received a graduate degree. Thus, 
only about one-third of all respondents (36.0%) 
do not have a college degree (but sixty percent of 
that group have some college education). Finally, 
almost six out of every ten (57.3%) are at least 
Fifty years old.
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RELATIONSHIP WITH CLASS I 
INTERCHANGE RAILROADS
It is absolutely essential to the financial health 
of a short-line that it maintain a good working 
relationship with the Class I railroads to whom 
it bridges traffic. Without their Class I “part­
ners,” short-lines would have no way of 
connecting, literally or figuratively, with most of 
the rest of the world. Correspondingly, short-line 
owners and managers in the study were asked:
Overall, how would you describe your 
company’s business relationship with the 
Class I railroads with which you interchange 
traffic?
____  Very Good   Good
____  Neither Good nor Bad _____ Bad
____  Very Bad
Figure 1 contains the basic results pertaining to 
this question. Only a very few respondents 
characterized their relationship with Class I 
railroads as being negative. Just three of the 
ninety-seven participants said that the 
relationship was bad, and no one said that it was 
very bad. Conversely, half of the respondents 
(50.0%) said that their relationship with 
interchanging Class I rail lines was good, and 
another fifteen percent (14.7%) said that it was 
very good. In total, 64.7% of all respondents said 
that they have a good or very good relationship 
with their Class I “partners.” The remaining one- 
third of respondents (31.6%) characterized the 
relationship as neither good nor bad.
Figure 2 can be used to compare the percent of 
respondents who said they have a good or very 
good relationship with their Class I interchange 
companies across various subgroups of the 
sample based on characteristics of the res­
pondent or his/her company.
The difference involving number of employees 
was statistically significant at the ten percent 
level (chi-square = 3.01; p < .10). Specifically, 
managers of companies with ten or more
employees were significantly more likely to say 
they have a good or very good relationship with 
their Class I interchange lines (73.5%) when 
compared to those from companies with fewer 
than ten employees (56.5%). Also, while not 
statistically significant, there was also a 
tendency for managers of older companies— 
formed prior to 1980—to more often say they 
have a good or very good relationship with their 
interchange railroads (76.5%) and for managers 
with a four year degree to say so (76.3%). 
Collectively, these were the only three subgroups 
in which more than seventy percent of managers 
felt their relationship to the relevant Class I 
roads was good or very good.
CLASS I RAILROAD MERGERS’ 
IMPACT ON SHORT-LINES
Since passage of the Staggers Act in 1980, there 
has been considerable merger activity involving 
the nation’s Class I railroads. How has this 
frenetic situation been received by the 
owner/managers of short-line railroads? To 
investigate this issue, each respondent was 
asked:
Do you think the recent history of mergers 
between Class 1 railroads has been good or 
bad for short-line rail companies?
____  Very Good _____Good
____  Neither Good nor Bad_____Bad
____  Very Bad
Please tell us why you responded as you did:
Figure 3 presents the percentage responses to 
this question. Clearly, more respondents think 
the merger activity has been bad for short-lines 
than think the reverse. In particular, 37.6% of 
respondents think that the merger activity has 
been bad for their sector, and another 18.3%
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FIGURE 1
SHORT LINE’S BUSINESS RELATIONSHIP WITH CLASS I INTERCHANGE RAILROADS
0 0% 10 0% 20 0% 30 0% 40 0% 50 0% 60 0%
Percent of Respondents
FIGURE 2
PERCENT INDICATING BUSINESS RELATIONS WITH CLASS I 
INTERCHANGE RAILROADS IS GOOD/VERY GOOD BY CLASSIFICATION DATA
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FIGURE 3
CLASS I RAILROAD MERGERS’ IMPACT ON SHORT LINES
TABLE 1
CLASS I MERGERS: CROSS-TABULATION ANALYSIS
Class I
Railroad
Mergers’
Impact on
Short Lines:
Respondent Age Respondent Education Year Company Formed TotalTrackage
Number of 
Employees
Total
< 50 
Years 
<%)
50 +
Years
(%)
No
degree
(%)
4 Year 
Degree 
<%)
Grad.
Degree
<%)
Before
1980
<%)
1980
to
1989
<%>
1990
to
2000
(%)
< 50 
miles 
<%)
50 + 
miles 
<%)
< 10 
(%)
10 + 
(%)
Good/Very Good 20.5 20.8 28.1 26.3 4.3 27.3 19.2 17.6 17.9 27.0 17.8 25.0 21.5
Neither 20.5 24.5 21.9 23.7 21.7 21.2 19.2 26.5 28.6 13.5 22.2 22.9 22.6
Bad/Very Bad 59.0 54.7 50.0 50.0 73.9 51.5 61.5 55.9 53.6 59.5 60.0 52.1 55.9
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.00
Base (39) (53) (32) (38) (23) (33) (26) (34) (56) (37) (45) (48) (93)
think it has been very bad. Altogether, more 
than half of the respondents (55.9%) think that 
the Class I mergers have affected short-lines 
negatively, as compared to just one in five 
(21.5%) who think this activity has been good or 
very good for short-lines. (Note: The remaining 
22.6% of respondents said the mergers have been 
neither good nor bad for their industry.) Overall, 
the short-line railroad industry has not reacted
well to the recent mergers involving their larger 
cousins.
Table 1 presents a set of descriptive comparisons 
of responses to this question across various 
subgroups of the sample. Generally, the 
contention that the recent merger history 
involving Class I roads has been bad or very bad 
for short line rail companies (representing 55.9%
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of all respondents) was stronger than average 
among respondents who:
• Possess a graduate degree (73.9%) and/or are 
less than fifty years old (59.0%).
• Represent a company formed in the decade 
following deregulation (61.5%).
• Work for a short-line with fewer than ten 
employees (60.0%) or at least fifty miles of 
track (59.5%).
Please keep in mind, however, that the overall 
differences between subgroups in a given classifi­
cation variable were modest; indeed, none was 
statistically significant at the ten percent level or 
less based on appropriate chi-square contingency 
table tests.
IMPACT OF CLASS I MERGERS ON 
SHORT-LINES: DETRIMENTAL 
ASPECTS
Respondents were also asked to explain why 
they felt as they did about the impact of Class I 
mergers. Of the 54 owner/managers who thought 
that Class I merger activity was either “bad” or 
“very bad,” we were able to categorize their 
responses into four general themes. Because 
some respondents mentioned more than one 
reason for their position, there were 84 
rationales enumerated. Each of these general 
themes will be examined in the descending order 
of frequency that they were stated. In addition, 
six reasons (7.1% of the total number of 
explanations) were mentioned only once or twice, 
and they are not included in the discussion.
Less Competition for Short-lines’ Business
The most common explanation why short-line 
owner/managers believe Class I merger activity 
has not been beneficial to them is that it has 
decreased competition for their business. 
Specifically, prior to the merger, the short-line 
was served by two competing Class I railroads, 
both of which desired to obtain more traffic from 
the short-line railroad. After the merger, with
competition often eliminated, there was no 
longer any reason to be concerned about the 
short-line’s business, because as a monopolist, it 
was obtained by default. This explanation was 
stated by 25 respondents, representing 29.8% of 
the total number of reasons enumerated. Below 
are five typical respondent comments. Each of 
these statements is either a direct quotation or 
an amalgamation of the comments of two or 
more respondents.
• Without competition service gets worse, prices 
rise, and nobody cares any more.
• Concentrated power produces less competition 
from the connecting Class I railroads.
• Class I mergers have created giants that are 
extremely difficult to communicate with 
because of their arrogance. Actually you do not 
work with them, they “dictate” rates, and are 
generally unwilling to negotiate any aspect of 
service that you would like to provide to your 
customers.
• We used to have two Class I’s that, at least at 
times, competed for our business. Now they 
have merged and we have been forgotten about 
in terms of meeting our needs, and those of our 
customers. Class I monopoly power is harmful 
to our long-term existence.
• When you have a monopoly, your attitude is 
different than when you have competition. This 
is exactly what is happening to Class I’s today. 
They have a monopoly, and they know we 
know it, and they let us know in no uncertain 
terms that “it’s our way or else—literally take 
it or leave it.”
Class I Merger-Related Service 
Breakdowns
Twenty-three respondents (representing 27.4% 
of the total reasons) stated that as a result of 
recent Class I unifications, and the resulting 
service catastrophes, it has affected their 
business in both the short and long-terms. Here 
are four of their observations:
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• Recent mergers, and the service disruptions 
that then took place, have focused rail 
management on merger integration and cost 
cutting, not on developing new business or 
improving service. In any case, the result is 
that frustrated shippers took their business to 
the trucking industry, and some of this traffic 
will never return to the rail system.
• First the Class 1’s merged. Then service levels 
suffered. The result—we lost business 
immediately and some of it has not come back 
and I don’t think it will.
• As the Class 1’s try to digest their mega­
mergers, service declines. This decline in 
service particularly impacts short-lines, 
because all we have to sell is service.
• Service has never been as bad as it is now and 
nobody at the super-roads seems to pay more 
than lip service to these problems. They just 
don’t get it.
Class I’s Have Minimal Interest in Single 
Car Shipments
Seventeen respondents (20.2% of the total 
reasons) stated that mergers have hurt their 
business because the newly enlarged Class I 
railroads seem to have little interest in single, or 
a few car, shipments. Below are three of their 
observations.
• Today Class I’s do not want to focus on the 
small moves—only on unit-trains, etc. These 
small moves are the “lifeblood” of short-line 
railroads. Their attitude is killing us and they 
don’t seem to care.
• Class I’s apparently do not desire to pick-up a 
small number of cars from short-lines. They 
just want high volume shipments between
major cities. Their marketing people do not 
understand our shippers’ needs and 
furthermore, they don’t want to.
• As the Class I’s become larger, the more their 
personalized service to short-lines gets lost in 
the shuffle. They do not realize, or if they do 
they don’t care, that all we have to sell is 
SERVICE!
Class I Bureaucracy Becomes Invidious
The final problem with Class I mergers, as noted 
by 13 of our respondents (15.5% of the total 
complaints), was that the resulting bureaucracy 
of the enlarged railroad made it more difficult to 
work with the Class I railroad. Below are three 
of their statements:
• The merged railroad becomes even more 
distant from us. We become more and more 
isolated from them, and they have a harder 
and harder time identifying with our situation. 
Their bureaucracies are so mammoth that it 
becomes very difficult for them to make 
decisions in a timely manner. We can make 
decisions almost immediately, but what good 
does it do us, since we have to interline almost 
all of our traffic with them.
• The larger the Class I’s become, the longer it 
takes them to respond to our needs and 
requests. Then when they finally do respond, 
they are less sensitive to our customers needs, 
both in terms of customized rates and services.
• Bigger is not better. It sure is slower when it 
comes to making decisions!
Table 2 summarizes the reasons why respon­
dents believed that Class I rail mergers are 
detrimental to short-line railroads.
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TABLE 2
DETRIMENTAL ASPECTS OF CLASS I 
MERGERS ON SHORT-LINE RAILROADS
Reasons Percentage
Less Competition for Short-Lines’ 
Business
29.8
Class I Merger-Related Service 
Breakdowns
27.4
Class Is Have Minimal Interest in
Single Car Shipments
20.2
Class I Bureaucracy Becomes Invidious 15.5
Miscellaneous 7.1
Total 100.0
IMPACT OF CLASS I MERGERS ON 
SHORT-LINES: POSITIVE BENEFITS
When respondents were asked their opinion 
about the Class I merger movement, 21 short­
line owner/managers thought it was either “very 
good” or “good.” When queried about why they 
took this position, we found that they 
cumulatively noted 28 reasons. Three statements 
were only mentioned once (10.7% of the total 
number of explanations) and are not included in 
the discussion below. Each of the two major 
explanations will be examined below in the 
descending order of frequency that they 
appeared.
Class I’s Will Only Offer Main-Line Service
Nineteen respondents (representing 67.9% of the 
total number of positive explanations) thought 
Class I mergers were beneficial for their industry 
because of the future direction of Class I 
operations. These respondents thought Class I’s 
will continue to heavily stress main-line intercity 
transportation service. Therefore, in many 
situations, the pick-up and delivery service will 
have to be provided by the short-lines. The 
result is the increasing importance of short-lines
to the rail industry. Below are Five of their 
statements.
• Class I’s do not want to be involved directly 
with customers. They desire to exclusively 
dispatch high volume, high speed intercity 
trains. We will become more and more 
important as the customer contact personnel 
with shippers/consignees. With our knowledge 
of each customer’s transportation require­
ments, we will provide the “real people” 
customer service that all shippers/consignees 
desire.
• Larger railroads do not want to be bothered by 
a lot of switching at both ends of a shipment, 
mainly because their labor costs are pro­
hibitively expensive. Nor do they want to be 
involved in shipments to smaller cities. Both of 
these situations are our “bread and butter.” 
This explains why we are in a growth industry.
• As each Class I gets bigger after a merger, they 
become less customer acquainted. These mega­
railroads do not care about the great majority 
of medium and smaller shippers/ receivers. 
This is great for us, because what they want 
out of us is our strength and passion.
• Switching is the bane of large railroads. It is 
our best service. Therefore, I love to see Class 
I mergers!
• Before the latest wave of Class I mergers, 
these large railroads were still trying to do 
their own pick-up and delivery. Therefore, they 
often did not want to try to work with me. Now 
they approach me and ask me to partner with 
them. It is an excellent division of labor. We 
are each doing what we do best.
Accelerating Trend To Sell Branch-Line 
Trackage
Six short-line owner/managers (representing 
21.4% of the total number of reasons enumer­
ated) stated that Class I mergers were beneficial 
to their industry because it would accelerate 
the sale of branch-line trackage to short­
Fall 2002 37
line carriers. Below are three of their 
observations.
• Class I’s will continue to spin-off low density 
trackage, which they are more and more 
defining as any trackage that is not part of 
their main-line system.
• Class I mergers are expensive. After the 
merger, to generate additional dollars to pay of 
debt, the combined carrier frequently sells off 
low traffic trackage.
• Labor costs are killing Class I railroads. These 
railroads can only operate efficiently and 
profitably on high volume main-line trackage. 
Especially after mergers, when top manage­
ment must now “make their numbers” to show 
the wisdom of the transaction, is when 
additional spin-offs take place.
Table 3 summarizes the reasons why short-line 
owner/managers believe Class mergers are 
beneficial to their industry.
OTHER IMPORTANT CLASS I TRENDS
Each respondent was also asked,
Besides merger activity, what do you believe 
will be the most important trend for Class I 
railroads in the next ten years?
We were able to categorize the responses into six 
general themes, each of which will be examined 
below. When answering this query, the 97 
respondents noted 117 reasons for their 
responses. There were 16 answers (13.7% of the 
total number of reasons enumerated) that were 
only mentioned once or twice, and they are not 
included in the discussion below. Each of the 
explanations will be examined in the descending 
order of frequency that they were mentioned.
Increased Utilization of Scheduled Trains
The most common response about future trends 
for Class I railroads involved the increased
TABLE 3
BENEFICIAL ASPECTS OF CLASS I 
MERGERS ON SHORT-LINE RAILROADS
Reasons Percentage
Class I Railroads Will Only Offer 
Main-Line Service
67.9
Accelerating Trend to Sell Branch- 
Line Trackage
21.4
Miscellaneous 10.7
Total 100.0
utilization of scheduled trains. This idea was 
noted by 36 managers, representing 30.8% of the 
total explanations given. This concept involves 
trains departing classification yards on set 
schedules, regardless of the number of cars that 
have been accumulated when the train is 
scheduled to leave (Vantuono 2001b; Ytuarte 
2001). The effect of this type of train operation is 
far more delivery schedule consistency. Below 
are four respondent statements:
• Service, service, service—this is what will save 
the rail industry. The key to this is scheduled 
train operations, and the CN is showing the 
world how it can be done.
• Our industry will become almost irrelevant if 
service levels do not improve. If they don’t, we 
will just get the bulk commodities that we get 
by default, such as coal, grain, sand, fertilizers, 
ores and bulk chemicals. The key to growth is 
consistent and reliable delivery schedules, and 
the key to this is scheduled train operations. It 
is as simple as that.
• Class I’s must shift their orientation to being a 
service oriented business, from one that is 
operationally oriented. Scheduled train despat­
ching is the obvious answer. At least I hope it 
is the obvious answer, because if the Class I’s 
don’t change, the industry will slowly die, and 
it will take my company down with them.
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• Re-engineering their operations to function 
more like the trucking industry. That is, run 
more trains on set schedules. Shippers will pay 
for a reliable and consistent service.
Continued Class I Sale of Light Traffic 
Density Trackage
Twenty-seven respondents (23.1% of all 
explanations) stated that Class I railroads will 
continue to sell their light traffic density 
trackage to short-lines. The reason is that Class 
I’s will operate with a new paradigm. It will 
involve running trains primarily on their main­
lines between major cities. Branch line trackage 
will be sold to the short-lines, which will then 
feed traffic to the Class Fs. In addition, Class Fs 
will desire to de-emphasize customer contact 
activities, such as pick-up and delivery services, 
which will be operated more efficiently by the 
short-lines. Here are three respondent obser­
vations.
• The new Class I business model will involve 
them operating high speed, frequently 
scheduled trains on their intercity main-lines. 
Short-lines will become their partners to feed 
traffic from shippers on lighter density 
trackage.
• Class I carriers will be in the “wholesale” 
transportation business. They will operate only 
on main-line corridors between major cities. 
The “retail” side of the rail business will be 
conducted by short-lines. We will be the 
customer contact people, who arrange pick-ups 
and delivery, and customize service levels for 
our shippers using the services of the Class I 
railroads.
• Customer relations and marketing in general 
is too labor intense for Class Fs. They just 
desire to run their trains on the high traffic 
density trackage. We will more and more 
assume the marketing activities of the Class 
Fs. Short-lines are starting to be appreciated 
by the Class Fs for the essential services we 
provide.
Rail Industry Renaissance
The 21st Century, according to 13 respondents 
(11.1% of all reasons), will experience a rail 
industry rebirth. The reason is that the highway 
system cannot continue to expand to accom­
modate additional traffic as the economy grows. 
In addition, automobile passengers will continue 
to press for governmental policies that shift 
truck traffic from the highway system to the 
underutilized rail industry. Here are three 
comments.
• Rail/truck intermodal shipments will be the 
norm for the 21st Century. It will happen 
because we as a country cannot afford to even 
maintain the existing highway system, let 
alone build new highway lanes. As this takes 
place, and it has to take place, we as short­
lines will prosper along with the Class Fs.
• Traffic must come off of the highways! They 
are too crowded now and the situation is 
getting worse year by year. Either traffic will 
go all rail, or it will be piggyback, but in any 
case it will be transported between cities by 
rail. This additional traffic will help the rail 
industry, and since the Class Fs look to us to 
be their marketing departments, our impor­
tance can only grow.
• In my judgment, this question is a no-brainer. 
The rail industry will become more important 
by default. Traffic cannot stay on the 
horrendously crowded highway system. The 
only place it can go is to the rail system which 
already has a substantial amount of 
unusedcapacity. I just hope the Class Fs don’t 
drop the ball on this issue.
Labor Cost Reduction
Ten short line-line owner/managers (8.5% of the 
reasons noted) said the most important Class I 
trend for the next decade is their reduction of 
labor costs. Here are two of their statements.
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• The rail industry is plagued by high labor 
costs. This is because the industry is highly 
unionized. Many people do not realize that of 
the three major modes of domestic 
transportation, truck, rail, and air, the rail 
industry has the highest average labor costs 
(not counting management). The only way for 
the rail industry to survive is to reduce labor 
costs. They will do this by outsourcing as many 
activities as possible. Short-lines will perform 
the origination and delivery function, as well 
as most customer service functions. The Class 
I’s will exclusively provide just train service 
between major cities, and all other activities 
will be outsourced to short-lines.
• Class I unionized labor rates must come down. 
Management will ask the craft and operating 
rail unions to allow cross-functional work- 
rules. Knowing rail unions, they will probably 
not agree to this. If this happens, and I’m sure 
it will, then Class I management will continue 
to outsource all but their main-line operations. 
This is why I believe the short-line rail 
industry will become more important in the 
future.
Governmental Funding of Rail 
Infrastructure
Although traditionally the rail industry has 
provided their own right-of-way with no 
governmental funding, this may change. Some 
Class I senior managers have said that this issue 
is too important, and the capital requirements 
are so great, that it needs to be studied with an 
open mind (Gallagher 2001b). Eight respondents 
(6.8% of the total reasons) said that in their 
judgment governmental funding of the rail 
infrastructure will become the norm. Here is one 
comment.
• Class I railroads are not maintaining their 
rights-of-way adequately. Just recently the 
BNSF stated that they are cutting back on 
their right-of-way maintenance, because the 
railroad is not earning its cost of capital. 
Therefore, if we as a country are going to shift 
traffic from the highways to the rails, we must
have a rail system that can accommodate this 
additional traffic. That is why both the federal 
and state governments are going to have to get 
involved in funding the rail infrastructure. And 
Class I management had better swallow their 
pride and accept this financial help, just the 
way the truckers and airlines have for decades.
Federal Rail Re-Regulation
Seven respondents (representing 6.0% of all 
reasons) thought that the rail industry would be 
re-regulated by the federal government because 
of the monopoly situation existing for many 
shippers today (Duff 2000b; Kertes 1998; 
Kruglinski 2001). This situation exists because 
there have been so many mergers that most 
shippers today are served by only one Class I 
carrier. Here is one observation.
• Class I's continue to alienate more shippers 
and community elected officials. This arro­
gance comes from being the “only game in 
town.” It will lead to reinvigorated efforts to 
re-regulate the railroads, because there is not 
enough competition between railroads any­
more. Any time an industry is federally 
regulated, its vitality is diminished. Hence 
short-lines will be hurt, because we are so 
dependent on the Class I’s to provide the long­
distance intercity movement.
Table 4 summarizes the Class I future trends as 
predicted by the survey respondents.
SUMMARY
Short-line owner/managers were asked to 
describe their business relationship with the 
Class I railroads with which they interchange 
traffic. The responses were positive; with almost 
two-third's selecting the “good” or “very good” 
choices. They were next queried regarding their 
thoughts about how Class I railroad mergers 
have affected their industry. Here the owner/ 
managers were less sanguine. More than half of 
the respondents thought these mergers had a 
detrimental impact on short-line railroads. When 
asked why they took this position, the three most
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TABLE 4
MOST IMPORTANT CLASS I TRENDS 
BESIDES MERGERS
Trends Percentage
Increased Utilization of Scheduled 
Trains
30.8
Continued Class I Sale of Light Traffic 
Density Trackage
23.1
Rail Industry Renaissance 11.1
Labor Cost Reduction 8.5
Governmental Funding of Rail 
Infrastructure
6.8
Federal Rail Re-Regulation 6.0
Miscellaneous 13.7
Total 100.0
common rationales were: (1) Less competition for 
short-line business, (2) Class I merger related 
service breakdowns, and (3) Class I’s have 
minimal interest in single car shipments. 
However, about one-fifth of the respondents 
thought that Class I mergers were beneficial to 
them. The two reasons for this position were: (1) 
Class I’s will offer only main-line service, and (2) 
The accelerating trend to sell branch-line 
trackage. The final question involved short-line 
owner/managers perceptions of the most 
important trends among Class I railroads, not 
counting mergers. The three most common 
responses were: (1) Increased utilization of 
scheduled trains, (2) Continued Class I sale of
Annual Reports of the Interstate Commerce 
Commission. Years: 1970, 1980, 1990 and 
1994. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government 
Printing Office.
Association of American Railroads (2002), E-mail 
received Feb. 5.
light traffic density trackage, and (3) A rail 
industry renaissance.
CONCLUDING COMMENT
The railroad industry is composed of two 
components—the short-lines and the Class I’s. 
This survey, in our judgment, conclusively 
illustrates the symbiotic relationship that exists 
between the two parts. They need each other. 
However, as this survey strongly indicates, only 
one of the two parties clearly understands this. 
Short-line owner/managers know that their 
destiny is tied to the Class I’s. Unfortunately, it 
appears that from the viewpoint of short-line 
owner/managers, their importance to the Class 
I’s is often not appreciated or even compre­
hended. As we gaze into our “crystal ball,” here 
is how we see the future. We believe Class I 
carriers will continue to spin-off low traffic 
density trackage to short-line railroads. The 
Class I’s will also outsource more activities that 
others can do more efficiently than they can. 
This will be especially prevalent with labor 
intensive functions, such as customer service 
activities and the pick-up and delivery of rail 
cars. The Class I’s will specialize in what they 
do best—running scheduled trains on main-line 
trackage between major cities. The short-lines 
will feed cars between the shippers/consignees 
and the Class I’s which provide the intercity 
transportation. As this relationship matures, 
both parties will desire to work together more 
closely for their own mutual benefit. The result 
will be a true “win-win-win” situation. Shippers/ 
consignees will receive better service at less cost, 
while each of the rail partners becomes more 
efficient and profitable. We believe the 21st 
Century will experience a rail renaissance.
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